A very good point by Nouriel on why the expectation of a temporary bailout may accelerate the crisis :

Going back to fundamentals, even if austerity and reforms were to
eventually restore Italy’s debt sustainability, the loss of market
credibility and the time that it will take to restore it require a
lender of last resort (LOLR) to provide support and prevent sovereign
spreads from exploding. Italy’s financing needs for the next 12 months
alone are not just the €400 billion of maturing debt and the expected
flow deficits; at this point, most investors long in Italian securities
would dump their entire holdings of Italian debt to the sucker—ECB or
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) or IMF or whoever else—that
would be willing to buy that debt at current yields as such yields (and
capital losses) could become much higher if that official support
eventually dribbles down. So now, the entire stock of €1.9 trillion of
Italian debt will soon be offered by the investors holding it if an LOLR
is on the other side of this game. The IMF loans (purportedly €600
billion) now circulating in news reports will also repeat the mistake of
the Greek program: By subordinating the existing debt to official
lenders, the likelihood of PSI is increased and recovery value is
decreased, elevating yields and precipitating a flight to the exit.

(from nouriel’s RGE )